



FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIII, No. 40

JULY 21, 1944

LIBERATED PEOPLES TACKLE PROBLEMS OF SELF-RULE

THE rapid advance of the Russian armies, which by July 18 had brought them within a few miles of East Prussia, is in sharp contrast to the relatively slow and arduous progress made by Allied forces in Normandy and Italy due to difficulties of terrain, and of fighting overseas without adequate port facilities. But while military operations in the west, as in 1914-18, have taken the form of a war of position, and those in the east of a war of movement over vast spaces, political problems in all theatres of battle continue to bear striking similarities. In Poland and Yugoslavia, as in Italy and France, the painful transition from a life of terror under German domination to attempts at self-rule is being gradually effected; and in each instance decisions, while inevitably influenced by the attitude of the great powers, are shaped, in the final analysis, by the temper of the people who have borne the brunt of conquest.

ARMISTICE TERMS TROUBLE ITALY. Of all the countries liberated from the Nazis, Italy offers the least hopeful appearance—partly because for twenty years its people had been subjected to Fascist authority, which had prevented the development of active political opinion except among a very small minority who for that very reason have been the special object of Nazi reprisals, partly because Italy is not only a liberated but also a defeated country. The terms of the armistice by which Marshal Badoglio, on behalf of his country, acknowledged its defeat on September 8, 1943, have not yet been made public. But reports from Rome indicate that they came as a shock to members of the Bonomi cabinet, some of whom apparently would like to throw the onus for their alleged harshness on the Allies.

Many Italians had hoped that, once their country had abandoned Germany, it would be treated as a co-belligerent, more or less indistinguishable from the United Nations. This hope can hardly be realized

in the immediate future when one recalls the suffering inflicted by Italian forces, willingly or unwillingly, in Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia—not to speak of the danger to which British and American forces were long exposed by Italo-German control of the coasts of the Mediterranean. Sympathy for the Italian people, and especially for those who consistently opposed Mussolini, cannot wipe out overnight the memory of Italy's participation in the war at the side of Germany for over two years. No people can be held responsible for every action of its rulers. But neither can any people be freed from all responsibility for action taken in its name by its rulers. The United States and Britain, concentrated on the winning of the war, have not done much about planning the rehabilitation of Italy—which in any case must await the liberation of its northern provinces, containing 85 per cent of its industrial establishments. But neither have the great powers sought to punish the Italians, whom they have treated in friendly fashion—although it is true that they have not fostered the utilization of Italian soldiers on the fighting fronts.

ITALIANS MUST FACE RESPONSIBILITIES. The Italian situation reveals what may happen in the case of Germany. It would have been better if the armistice terms had been concluded with representatives of the Mussolini régime, who would then have been clearly saddled with the blame for launching a war that could result in such terms. Marshal Badoglio might have been regarded, in this respect, as the next best choice, since he had been associated with Mussolini. Yet that very association caused many people in Britain and the United States to demand his removal at the earliest possible opportunity, and his replacement by a régime that would more closely represent anti-Fascist forces. The Bonomi cabinet—although headed by a Premier who recalls the days of frustration before 1922, when

liberals and socialists failed to prevent Mussolini's rise to power—at least meets the wishes of those who wanted an Italian cabinet based on representation of all the political parties. If now this cabinet should have to carry out, even in part, armistice terms the Italian people may regard as harsh, its position might prove no more stable or enviable than that of the Weimar republic.

The answer to this, however, is not to denounce the Allies, as Commander Pacciardi, who served gallantly in the Spanish civil war on the side of the Loyalists, is doing in *Voce Repubblicana*, the Republican organ of Rome. Instead, the leaders of the new Italy who have sought the responsibility of governing it in this critical transition period must invite the Italian people to face as realistically as possible the heritage left by the Fascist era both in domestic and foreign affairs. It is a sad heritage, and it is obvious that Italy will not be able either to restore its economic life or to play an active role on the international stage without concrete, and sympathetic, assistance on the part of the Allies. But it will be difficult to enlist aid abroad for Italy—especially at a time when countries which determinedly resisted Hitler are in dire need of aid—unless the Italians, as represented by their political leaders, show a determination to help themselves.

POLISH-RUSSIAN DETENTE. Meanwhile, the Polish-Russian controversy, which at one time threatened to bring about a serious rift among the United Nations, has assumed a less disturbing aspect. On July 8 *Wolna Polska*, organ of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow which seemed for a while to claim the exclusive right to represent the Polish people, said that the next step in Polish-Russian relations "apparently lies with Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and his negotiations with the United States will serve as a starting point." The decrease in tension between the two countries is due apparently to three main factors. First of all, the Allied invasion of France dispelled any lingering doubts the Soviet government might still have had concerning the all-out military collaboration of Britain and the United States, and noticeably improved the atmosphere of diplomatic negotiations between the three great powers. Second, the Russians, on coming closer to Poland, have discovered that the Polish underground is both more effective and more favorably disposed toward the Polish

government in London than they had been led to expect. And, third, Premier Mikolajczyk left Washington with the definite impression that, while the United States is ready to facilitate a Polish-Russian reconciliation, it will not go to war with Russia over Poland's territorial claims.* This, however, has not alleviated his cabinet's concern over the status of Vilna, which Stalin proclaimed as the capital of Soviet Lithuania. The rapprochement of Catholics and Communists in Italy is not without bearing on the Polish situation. Poland, a predominantly Catholic country, has been of special concern to the Vatican, which had feared that Russian occupation might prove a serious threat to the Catholic Church. Any friendly gesture by the Russians toward Poles now in Poland contributes to a future understanding between Moscow and the Vatican.

Progress, too, has been made by the new Yugoslav cabinet in London, headed by Dr. Ivan Subashitch, who has apparently established good working relations with Marshal Tito. Contrary to the allegations of former Yugoslav Ambassador Fotitch who on July 8 declared in Washington that the Subashitch government was unrepresentative because it contained no Serbs, Subashitch—himself a Croat—has in the cabinet he formed on July 7 two prominent Serbs: Professor Sreten Vukosavljevitch, Minister of Supply, Agriculture, Mines and Forests, and Sava Kosanovitch, Minister of Internal Affairs. Mr. Fotitch's statement reflects the views of extremist nationalist Serbs who, in contrast to Serbs of liberal views, have resisted the creation of a truly united Yugoslavia in which Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would collaborate on terms of equality.

It is encouraging to see that the unremitting efforts of political leaders, who in the darkest hour did not despair of eventually adjusting seemingly hopeless conflicts of opinion, are slowly beginning to bear fruit. These developments offer many lessons for the future—not the least of which is that human relations, which run the gamut from pity and love to hate and cruelty, cannot be fitted into any universal formula, be it that of revolution or conservatism. The new Europe, and the new world, will have in them a little of everything—with mixtures of different strength brewed in different countries according to circumstances.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

*See "Polish Premier Makes Good Impression," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, June 23, 1944.

CONGRESS AUTHORIZES PRESIDENT TO ACT ON OPIUM

Another move forward in the international control of opium was made on June 22, when the Senate unanimously passed a resolution first introduced in the House by Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota—and passed by the House—authorizing the President to urge countries producing opium to limit the volume of production strictly to medical and scientific purposes. This action follows logically the

decision of Britain and the Netherlands to discontinue the government monopoly system for selling opium for smoking in their colonial territories in the Far East.* Hence, in the post-war period, there will be no legal market for export opium except for medical and scientific needs.

*See "Dutch and British Pledge End of Opium Smoking Monopoly," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 21, 1944.

The principal countries to which the President will address the notes contemplated in the resolution are Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran, India, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan opium plays only a small part in the international market at present. However, its production will become important if its neighbors reduce their crop, thus making smuggling from Afghanistan more profitable for the illicit trader. No part of the world is too remote for the activities of smugglers. Yugoslavia and Turkey have had, in the past, a joint marketing and sales arrangement, effectively administered. All opium from this area was sold for the manufacture of drugs under the Import and Export Certificate system, and there was no considerable leakage of this material into the illicit traffic for some years before the war.

SITUATION IN IRAN. Iran has never adhered to any of the opium treaties, with the result that opium produced in that country has been sold to any and all buyers. Iranian opium has been found in almost all seizures of illicit opium smuggled into this country and Canada. It was a major source of difficulty in the Far East, when the government monopoly systems were attempting to prevent opium from being smuggled into their territories, as "bootleg" competition for government sales. Shipments of many tons left Bushire, consigned ostensibly to Vladivostok, but actually appeared in every port where there was a smuggling market. These facts were made public year after year in the meetings of the Opium Advisory Committee at Geneva, but without effect on Iranian policy. The illicit market produced more revenue, with no administrative problem of control, than any share of the regular market for drug manufacture which Iran might hope to receive if it had accepted the system of international cooperation and control.

Another difficulty in the Iranian situation is the internal use of opium for smoking and, in certain parts of the country, for eating. Production of opium for internal use by its own nationals might be claimed by Iran to be a matter of no concern to the United States. But the main principle on which this country

has based its policy is that any production of opium in excess of medical and scientific needs constitutes a danger and a potential source of illicit traffic, and is therefore properly the concern of this government. For smuggled opium flows to that market where the highest prices are obtainable as surely as water flows downhill.

There is some evidence that the present government of Iran will be more receptive to a note from the United States than the past administration. The matter will be watched with much interest by those circles in this country whose duty it is to inform American public opinion of the facts on this question.

The note to India must be framed to meet quite a different situation. Since 1935 the Government of India has not exported opium for smoking. Occasional seizures of Indian opium, chiefly from Native States sources, have been made in the illicit traffic. There is however in India, as in Iran, a large crop grown for internal use. The sale of opium is licensed by the government for eating, and in certain provinces this consumption is very high. The reduction of the production of Indian opium to medical and scientific needs will be one of the problems to be solved by whatever government is established in India after the war.

HELEN HOWELL MOORHEAD

NEW RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER

The Association announces with pleasure the appointment to the Research Department of Olive Holmes. Miss Holmes received a B.A. at Barnard College; an M.A. at Columbia University in international law and relations; and spent a year and a half at the University of Chile Law School studying the legal status of women and the family in Latin America. Before returning to this country in June 1944, Miss Holmes spent six months visiting Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Colombia.

The Fruits of Fascism, by Herbert L. Matthews. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1943. \$3.00.

One of the most interesting expositions of the movement and its failure by one who has long known and liked the Italian people.

Palestine, Land of Promise, by Walter Clay Lowdermilk. New York, Harper, 1944. \$2.50.

A well-known soil conservationist praises the Zionists' record in Palestine and estimates that a land reclamation project would make it possible for an additional four million refugees to settle there.

The Lion Rampant, by L. de Jong and Joseph W. F. Stoppelman. New York, Querido, 1944. \$3.00.

The inspiring story of the heroic stand of the Netherlands under Nazi occupation.

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
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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 40, JULY 21, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEBT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



ALLIED ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINA DETERRED BY WAR NEEDS

Bellicose statements and actions on the part of the Farrell régime in Argentina have caused concern in Washington lest a South American war break out as an epilogue to war in Europe or Asia. In June the Farrell régime created a National Defense Council, whose purpose is to fit the whole Argentine economy into a military plan. On May 23 the War Ministry decided to set up a new army division, the Seventh, which is to be stationed along the Paraguayan and Brazilian borders. On July 1 the Argentine navy placed a contract for 100 radios with Siemens-Schukert, a contracting firm on the Allied black list. All these measures have had a disturbing effect on inter-American harmony and the program of the United Nations.

A PROBLEM FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY. The desirability of discouraging a régime with such tendencies is plain, especially when the tendencies are complemented by a policy of repression of domestic rights that includes tolerance of anti-Semitic outbursts and the institution of severe controls over education, press and labor. But the United States is proceeding cautiously in dealing with Argentina, because the conduct of the war and the need for complete victory at the earliest possible moment are the decisive factors today in our decisions concerning any international issue. Argentina's economic usefulness to the Allies complicates the formulation of any policy aimed at weakening the present Buenos Aires government. This dilemma of having to choose between the adjustment of problems raised by the current war and of problems that might be raised by a possible war in the future fogs the atmosphere in which officials in Washington are conferring with Norman Armour, American Ambassador to Argentina. Mr. Armour has been in an anomalous position since General Edelmiro Farrell assumed the Presidency on February 28, because the United States declined to recognize his government, and has therefore had no diplomatic relations with it.

ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC TRUMPS. For the conduct of the current war the United States and Britain need beef, linseed and corn produced by Argentina, and the advocates of economic sanctions are unable to offer the Allies any substitute source of those commodities. Another factor that affects our policy is the need for Anglo-American cooperation with respect to Argentina. Britain hesitates to take drastic steps which might cause the Argentine régime, in reprisal, to expropriate the extensive Brit-

ish properties within its borders. However, Sir David Kelley, British Ambassador to Buenos Aires, who stopped in Washington on his way to London, will submit to his government a summary of this country's attitude and of events in Argentina. The Farrell régime is clearly anti-foreign, and it is quite possible that it may expropriate foreign properties whether Britain acts or not.

A third deterrent to action on the Argentine question is the hope which still exists in some official quarters that the Farrell régime will mend its ways, abandon its bellicosity, and embrace inter-American collaboration. Those who hold this view were encouraged when, on July 5, Juan Domingo Perón, Argentine War Minister, became Vice President and, on July 6, General Luis Cesar Perlinger, Minister of the Interior, retired from the cabinet. Perlinger is an intransigent foe of the United States, while Perón has fostered a belief that he favors the United Nations and inter-Americanism in foreign policy and a return to constitutionalism in domestic affairs. On June 10, however, he made a belligerent speech at La Plata which the State Department subsequently publicized, and on May 2 sponsored the appointment of Orlando Peluffo as Foreign Minister. Peluffo fenced for Argentina in the 1936 Olympic Games at Berlin, where his friendship for the Nazis led the Argentine Sporting Federation to bar him from sports activities for five years.

SUMNER WELLES INFLUENTIAL. A fourth obstacle to a clean-cut decision on ways and means of implementing our policy of nonrecognition is the natural hesitation of the Roosevelt Administration, which has fostered the Good Neighbor Policy, to make any move that could justifiably be condemned as intervention in the domestic affairs of another American republic. On May 29 former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, urging recognition of Farrell, said that forceful action to cause changes in existing régimes in Latin America might inflame latent nationalism. It is noteworthy that on June 25 the Farrell régime required newspapers and radio stations in Argentina to report Mr. Welles' remarks. The influence of Mr. Welles remains strong at the State Department, but Department advocates of forceful action contend that stern measures are permissible because the internal policy of President Farrell is injurious to our interests.

BLAIR BOLLES

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